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INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade ago, scientists at Hammersmith hospital in London developed a 
technique called pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).' PGD involves taking a 6-8 
cell in-vitro embryo, removing one or two cells from it by biopsy and then analysing 
genetic material taken from these cells. The development of the technique opened the 
door to IVF users being able to choose to have some of the genetic characteristics of 
their in-vitro embryos identified. It is possible, for example, to use it to detect certain 
genetic disorders. Indeed, it is now widely used across Europe for this purpose.2 
Genetic disorders fall into two categories: chromosomal anomalies and gene defects. 
Chromosomes are the structures in the nucleus of a cell which carry the genes of the 
individual concerned. Normal human (diploid) cells contain 46 chromosomes - 22 pairs of 
autosomes and 2 sex chromosomes XX (female) and XY (male).3 
Some anomalies result in the embryo not surviving, whilst others will cause an 
abnormality {e.g. Down's Syndrome) or disorder. Gene defects are mutations of the 
genetic code that can result in a genetic disease. Examples of such diseases are cystic 
fibrosis, beta thalessemia and Duchenne's muscular dystrophy. It is also possible to use 
PGD to identify the tissue type of in-vitro embryos and the gender, hair and eye colour 
for which they are encoded. PGD could also be used to predict behaviour and 
intelligence, if science can ever overcome the difficulties of identifying these attributes 
from genes.4 
The revolutionary aspect of PGD is the fact that IVF clients can use it to decide 
which, if any, of their in-vitro embryos to implant. For example, if it is found that an 
in-vitro embryo has a particular disorder, the clients may choose not to implant it. 
Alternatively, the clients might be able to fulfil a desire to implant an embryo that is 
encoded for blue eyes and blonde hair. Both such uses hint that PGD raises serious 
ethical issues. Indeed, there are three hurdles that must be overcome if PGD use is to 
be considered ethical: firstly, it must be shown that IVF itself is ethical. Secondly, it 
must be shown that to test and carry out a biopsy on an in-vitro embryo is not of itself 
unethical. Thirdly, since PGD works within a regime where people can choose to 
discard in-vitro embryos, it must be shown that it is ethically acceptable to discard and 
to do so selectively according to genetic criteria. 
The legal control of PGD hinges on interpretation of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. The Act was passed to make provision in connection with 
human embryos and subsequent development of such embryos; to prohibit certain 
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practices in connection with embryos and gametes, to establish a Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority and for other related purposes. The Authority can license 
clinics to undertake some practices which without a licence would be prohibited. The 
Authority considers PGD to be such a practice. Following a public consultation in 
1993 it had concluded that PGD should not be used for gender selection for social 
reasons.5 In 1999 the Authority consulted with the public again on the broader issue 
of when, if at all, PGD should be used.6 At this stage the Authority had already 
licensed four centres to use the technique to detect chromosomal anomalies and serious 
disorders.7 
The instant case involved the now famous Hashmi family. Mr. and Mrs. Hashmi 
wanted to use PGD to test in-vitro embryos not just for a serious disorder but also for 
tissue-type. The context was that one of their existing children, Zain, had a serious 
inherited blood disorder called beta thalessaemia. A stem cell transplant was a possible 
cure. However, none of the family was a suitable genetic match for Zain. The Hashmis 
set about having more children in the hope that if they had one who was both matched 
and free of beta thalessaemia, stem cells from the placenta could be transplanted to 
Zain. Mrs. Hashmi went on conceive naturally and abort an embryo that was shown 
by pre-natal testing (PND) to have beta thalessaemia. From a second natural 
conception she had a child who was tested free of beta thalessaemia but was not a 
match. After this she met Dr. Simon Fishel, the Managing and Scientific Director of 
C A R E (Centres for Assisted Reproduction Limited). He suggested that if Mr. and Mrs. 
Hashmi used IVF, PGD could be performed on the resultant embryos to find one 
that was beta thalessaemia free and a match. The Authority accepted a request to 
allow such dual purpose use. However, before anything could proceed, Josephine 
Quintavalle, acting on behalf of a pressure group called Comment on Reproductive 
Ethics (CORE) brought an action for judicial review of the Authority's decision. 
T H E DECISION OF T H E H I G H COURT 
Giving judgment in the High Court, Kay J. made two findings. Firstly, he found that 
the biopsy and testing activities involved using an embryo and, hence, could not be 
unregulated activities because section 3(1) of the Act states that embryos can only be 
created, kept or used pursuant to a licence.8 On appeal, the Authority conceded this 
point.9 However, it challenged10 Kay J.'s second finding: that testing for a tissue match 
could not be licensed." This second conclusion was largely based on an analysis of two 
provisions: paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 2, which limits the granting of a licence for 
treatment to activities that "appeared to the Authority to be necessary or desirable for 
the purpose of providing treatment services";12 and section 2(1) which defines 
treatment services as "medical, surgical or obstetric services provided to the public or 
a section of the public for the purpose of assisting women to carry children". Kay J. 
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held that testing for tissue matches was not necessary or desirable for the purpose of 
assisting a woman to carry a child because it had no impact on the ability of the 
woman to carry the embryo after implantation.13 
T H E DECISION OF T H E C O U R T OF APPEAL 
The Court of Appeal took the view that a biopsy to facilitate testing for the purposes 
at hand presented no problem provided that testing for these purposes was itself 
licensable. The court accepted three contentions about the law relating to PGD:1 4 
1. It was not a totally unlicensable activity when done for the purpose of detecting 
abnormality. 
2. It could be licensed not just for the purpose of detecting abnormalities that 
threatened carriage and birth but also those that only threatened the health of the child 
after birth and/or the health of future generations. 
3. A licence could also cover testing for desirable characteristics (at the very least in 
the instant case where if the embryo with the desirable characteristics was implanted 
and given birth to, its mother might be able to cure Zain with a donation of stem cells 
from the placenta). 
The first contention is easy to agree with. Paragraph l(l)(d) of Schedule 2 allows 
under licence "practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to 
be placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that purpose". 
Parliamentary proceedings made it clear that Parliament's view was that this section 
would allow PGD for the detection of abnormality.15 Furthermore, paragraph 3(2)(b) 
of Schedule 2 of the Act permits embryo research activities to be licensed for the 
purpose of "developing methods for detecting the presence of gene or chromosome 
abnormalities in embryos before implantation". It would clearly be inconsistent to 
allow PGD for the detection of abnormality in the context of research but not in the 
context of treatment. 
In relation to the second contention, counsel for Mrs. Quintavalle sought to reconcile 
the fact that Parliament had intended to allow P G D to test for abnormalities with Kay 
J.'s view that the phrase "treatment services" in section 2(1) was restricted to activities 
that assisted women to overcome problems in conceiving and carrying a child to 
term.16 The reasoning was that PGD to screen out embryos with abnormalities was 
consistent with helping women do this because abnormalities generated a greater risk 
of problems in pregnancy and birth.17 However, as Mance L.J. noted, it had been 
demonstrated in expert evidence that some abnormalities did not generate such a risk.18 
Hence, the implication of Kay J.'s approach is that the Act only allows testing 
abnormalities to be licensed where the abnormality poses an added risk of problems in 
pregnancy and birth. However, the Court of Appeal held that licensing was not 
restricted in this fashion for two reasons: firstly, that there was nothing in Parliamen-
tary proceedings or in the Act's approach to research that supported such a 
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restriction; and secondly, that the phrase "assisting women to carry children" under 
section 2(1) should be interpreted broadly to include any assistance without which 
women might be less inclined to have children. This meant that even testing for 
abnormalities that did not affect pregnancy or birth was licensable since without the 
security of having it some women would be put off having children altogether.20 
The third contention was, did this more generous definition of treatment services also 
support biopsy and genetic testing that enabled a choice between healthy embryos 
based on a desire for certain characteristics? The Court of Appeal reasoned that it does, 
as without it a woman will not get to have the child she wants and this may lead her 
not to want the child at all. Indeed, this appeared to be the scenario in the immediate 
case; the Hashmis did not seem to want another child unless it was not only free of 
beta thalessaemia but had a genetic make-up compatible with Zain. 
C R I T I Q U E O F T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L ' S R E A S O N I N G 
The ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeal's decision can be found in the statement of 
Lord Phillips M . R . that where P G D 
has the purpose of producing a child free from genetic defects, or of producing a child with 
stem cells matching a sick or dying sibling, the IVF treatment that includes the 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis constitutes "treatment for the purpose of assisting 
women to bear children".21 
However, this view of the law requires us to accept an extremely broad view of the 
term "treatment". The strict view of the term "treatment" is that it is something 
designed to address an underlying condition. The relevant underlying condition of 
those seeking I V F is that they have problems having children naturally or at least 
having healthy children naturally. In-vitro embryo biopsy and testing can be consistent 
with the latter when it is to enable people to choose an embryo free of an abnormality, 
such as beta thalessaemia. However, biopsy and testing to enable people to choose an 
embryo genetically encoded with a particular eye or hair colour, gender (on a social 
basis) or tissue match with an existing child is not treating an underlying condition. 
Medical interventions in other contexts that do not treat an underlying condition are 
on the borderline of the term "treatment" at best when they are designed to undertake 
an elective "improvement" on a well individual (e.g. elective cosmetic surgery). 
However, where - as in the instant case - they are purely about fulfilling the needs of 
a third party, they are firmly entrenched within the non-therapeutic category. The 
Court of Appeal's view that this was treatment is thus dubious and subversive of the 
purpose of these sections: that being to help women overcome problems having 
(healthy) children naturally. Mrs . Hashmi was not using the services for this purpose 
but to fulfil her desire to help an existing child (to the point where it appeared she 
would not want a child at all unless guaranteed that both forms of testing were 
performed). 
E T H I C A L ISSUES 
Is IVF in itself ethical? 
Before examining the issues specific to the instant case, I want to consider whether, 
regardless of the circumstances, the practice of I V F can be justified on ethical grounds. 
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Clearly, where consenting adults wish to have a family naturally, this is something 
extremely private in which the state should not interfere. However, the question of 
whether humans should use technology to reproduce themselves is very much one that 
the state has a role in determining. I take the view that whilst technology should be 
used to enhance our lives and overcome certain limits, there is, in Kantian terms, a 
categorical imperative22 to have humility in relation to the life creation process. Such 
an imperative would bar the artificial creation of existing forms of life. It would also 
bar the artificial creation of variants such as pigs with human genes in them; plants 
with genetic material from other plants and animals artificially inserted into them and 
finally embryos that have been cloned. The norm is to focus on the consequences of 
such creation in assessing whether it is right or wrong. However, public concern may 
also be based on the view that we have no business treading in these areas. The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine appears to voice a form of 
such absolute thinking by banning the creation of cloned human beings partly on the 
basis that allowing it offends human dignity.23 If human cloning is wrong partly 
because it is an "instrumentalisation of human beings"24 then creating other forms of 
"artificial" life and creating existing forms of life artificially can be viewed as wrong 
partly on the same basis. 
Is testing the embryo ethical? 
Even i f I V F is to be used does that mean we should allow P G D ? There are concerns 
about its accuracy and also that it may have adverse effects on the embryo much as 
it is thought pre-natal diagnosis (PND) may do. Although there are some studies on 
the accuracy and effect of P G D and some comparisons with the effect of P N D , the 
quality of the evidence appears to be of limited value. In reviewing the data, Mclntyre 
concludes that there is: 
no reliable evidence to compare effects of PGD with other pre-natal diagnostic strategies 
on take home baby rates and congenital anomalies among couples undergoing IVF. We 
found no reliable evidence regarding diagnostic sensitivity and specificity of PGD for both 
chromosomal and genetic abnormalities, although case series have reported that missed 
diagnosis is rare.25 
She suggests that: 
Controlled studies are needed to compare PGD versus "conventional" pre-natal diagnostic 
strategies among couples undergoing IVF. Studies should report on a standard set of 
pre-defined outcomes including take home baby rate per couple, details of neonatal 
examination, ante-natal testing rates and results and sensitivity and specificity of the 
diagnostic technique. Until such time, the conclusions suggested by the identified studies 
should be regarded as tentative.26 
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A dedication to detailed, timely and impartial analysis of the effects of P N D and 
P G D is called for. 
The ethical context of PGD use - questions of creation, use and disposal of in-vitro 
embryos and their selective disposal 
Since P G D is designed to facilitate selective disposal of in-vitro embryos, a discussion 
of the ethics of genetic selection and of embryo discarding per se is crucial. The law 
relating to abortion is the traditional means of protecting embryos. The Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, section 58, makes it a criminal offence, punishable by life 
imprisonment to, "procure the miscarriage of any woman". Section 59 criminalises the 
supply of drugs or other instruments for use in procurement of a miscarriage. The 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, section 1(1) creates an offence of child destruction 
to protect the "chi ld" (i.e. foetus) that is "capable of being born alive" from any 
person undertaking wilful acts with "intent to destroy" its life. However, the Abortion 
Act 1967, section 1(1)27 provides that: 
. . . a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a 
pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical 
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith-
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children 
of her family; or 
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman; or 
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
Conflicting categorical imperatives are in operation here. The principal conflict is 
between the life of a being and the right of the pregnant woman to bodily control. One 
must give way for the other to be protected. The law comes up with a compromise. 
As regards medical interventions generally, the pregnant woman's right to self-
determination is protected i f she is competent28 and her best interests protected if she 
is not.29 However, her right to bodily security on its own is treated as insufficient to 
warrant her having an abortion. There must additionally be a disability of the kind laid 
out in section l(l)(d) or (s)he and/or her existing children must have a sufficient health 
interest (combined effect of sections l(l)(a) - (c)). A n interesting feature of this is that 
it still requires this interest to be present when conception occurred from rape. The 
philosophy appears to be that if one is hosting a being - or at least this particular kind 
of being which is either a potential human being or according to some "a human being 
or person with potential"30 - one needs a justification not to continue doing so even 
if that hosting was not brought about by voluntary conduct. This unacceptably 
contravenes a legal norm that people should not have to sacrifice their right of bodily 
27
 As amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s. 37. 
28
 St. George's Health Care NHS Trust v. S. [1999] Fam 26 (C.A.). 
29
 See, for example, Re MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F .L .R . 426 (C.A.). 
30
 Ford, N . , When Did I Begin? (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 82. Ford suggests that this does not apply to the 
embryo that has not yet developed a primitive streak (ibid, at pp. 164-182 especially). 
82 Nottingham Law Journal 
security to meet the needs of others unless they have voluntarily engaged in conduct 
that results in them owing a duty to give up that security to those others.31 
Section 1(1) is also clearly aimed at making it more difficult to have an abortion after 
the 24th week at which point the foetus is capable of being alive.32 This is an example 
of the law protecting the embryo/foetus differentially according to its level of 
development. Another is the fact that abortion law does not cover the embryo that is 
not yet implanted. Offences under the 1861 Act are connected with the procurement of 
miscarriage, which requires carriage. Carriage does not take place until implantation 
according to the High Court in R. v. Secretary of State for Health, Ex Parte John 
Smeaton (On Behalf of The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) and (1) 
Schering Health Care Ltd (2) Family Planning Association (Interested Parties).33 This 
position protects the freedom to use birth control methods that prevent implantation 
of a fertilised embryo, such as the morning after pill and I U D . 3 4 Non-implanted 
embryos are only protected by reproduction law when they are in-vitro (by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act) and here only to a limited degree. The rationale for 
this is principally that they have not yet developed a primitive streak. The primitive 
streak develops at 15-18 days after conception and results in an embryo having cellular 
identity.35 U p until the middle of the last century, the primitive streak was regarded as 
sufficiently significant by many to warrant embryos that had not yet developed it being 
given a separate name within: 
a threefold distinction of pre-natal life. So for instance, the physician and Jesuit Austin 
O'Malley opens Chapter 3 of his book The Ethics of Medical Homicide (1921) remarking 
without ado that: "By embryologists from the moment the spermatozoon joins the nucleus 
of the ovum until the end of the second week of gestation of conception the product is 
called the Ovum; from the end of the second week to the end of the fourth week it is the 
Embryo; from the end of the fourth week to birth it is the Fetus (p. 33)".36 
Some thinkers try to make light of the significance of the embryo before the primitive 
streak lacking cellular identity by using what Lee and Morgan classify as an "I 'm in 
there somewhere" type of argument.37 However, this argument misses the point that 
the embryo in this state is not, in fact, an embryo at all but a bunch of cells, at this 
point only an undetermined group of which will go on to become an embryo. This 
would suggest that we are dealing with something out of which an identity will be 
formed rather than something that already has an identity within it. 
The question is how should we treat this identity-less ovum? The answer depends on 
what we construe its potential to be and what we make of this. In European terms, 
Mor i notes that the submerging of the ovum into the embryo category became 
31
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common after the Second World War.38 His thesis is that this was linked to a wider, 
Christian-dominated, theoretical treatment of the reproductive process. Mainstream 
Christian churches viewed it as a moral absolute that sexual acts should only be 
undertaken within the bounds of marriage and for the sole purpose of reproduction. 
To this end they all opposed contraception until 1930 when the Anglican Church 
altered its view. St. Augustine's particular view was that contraception was homicidal 
for "he who is about to become a man is one already, and all the fruit is contained 
in the seed".39 In the modern context, this is patently absurd, not least because the seed 
in question does not even have the latent potential to be a fruit within itself; to become 
an ovum it needs to mix with another type of reproductive material (an egg). 
Furthermore, more modest expressions of this restrictive view of sexual expression and 
reproduction are still problematic. As Mori notes, such expressions obviously conflict 
with the view that it is legitimate to control reproduction,40 a view that can be morally 
located within the perspective that humans are here to grow and that sexual expression 
is one dimension of experience through which growth can occur. If the overarching 
purpose is growth, birth control is potentially not just acceptable but a positive 
personal moral duty where having a child would give rise to more problems than 
benefits. 
Mori's solution to the conflict is to suggest that people "who believe that there are 
absolutes are allowed to behave accordingly, but they cannot impose their view on 
people who think that there are no absolutes".41 However, this defence of reproductive 
freedom can be criticised as nihilistic. Ultimately, if we do not defend some values as 
absolute, such as the value of not harming others except in legitimate self-defence, we 
would be left with a Hobbesian lawless state. A better line of attack is to suggest that 
it is by no means obvious that we should sacrifice growth for the sake of sexual 
expression defined in such a limited way. Furthermore, the limited view can be attacked 
as highly questionable from its own religious basis. The psychologist Wilhelm Reich 
did this in The Mass Psychology of Fascism. He addressed a mass rally in Berlin on the 
subject of sex and reproduction in the early 1930s through a series of questions: 
1. The church contends that the use of contraceptives is contrary to nature, as is 
any interference with natural procreation. If nature is so strict and so wise, 
why did it produce a sexual apparatus that does not impel one to engage in 
coitus only as often as one wants to procreate children, but on the average of 
two or three thousand times in a lifetime? 
2. Would the representatives of the church who were present state openly if they 
engaged in sexual intercourse only when they wanted to procreate children? 
(They were Protestant pastors.) 
3. Why did God produce two kinds of glands in one's sexual apparatus: one for 
sexual excitation and one for procreation? 
4. How did they explain the fact that even small children developed a sexuality, 
long before the procreation function begins?42 
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Reich's thesis is that the restrictive view of the role of sexual expression was in fact 
merely a distortion and inhibition of its true function. He proceeds to demonstrate that 
this repression is at the heart of the development of authoritarian character and hence 
of the development of fascism within the psyche.43 
There are sound reasons indeed, then, to suggest that there is nothing wrong with 
active contraception. The fact that the sperm has the potential to combine with an egg 
and ultimately become a human means no more than that it is of special value. This 
brings us back to the ovum. Harris has suggested that just because the ovum/embryo/ 
foetus has potential to become a human does not mean that we should treat it any 
differently from sperm or even from many ordinary cells in the human body which 
could be used to clone a human by cell nuclear replacement.44 However, the reason 
why an ovum is different from both sperm and such ordinary cells is that it is already 
a life-form with the latent potential to become a human already entirely genetically 
encoded within it. This special nature means that it has special value. However, does 
it have more than that? It has a much weaker case than the embryo proper for arguing 
that it has rights because of its lack of identity. The case is too weak to warrant the 
law restricting the freedom of a woman who has voluntarily allowed its creation to be 
forced to continue hosting it or be forced to have it inserted after being created in-vitro. 
Equally, it is probably too weak to suggest that she should be restricted to creating the 
number of in-vitro ova that she intends to have implanted. Indeed, if the ovum's 
significance lies wholly or largely in its potential to become an embryo proper and then 
a human; creating an excess beyond that number within reasonable limits may even be 
desirable: it maximises the chance of at least one ovum beating the poor odds of 
treatment success and fulfilling its latent potential. It would also, on this basis, be 
desirable to create an excess as an "insurance policy" against one or more ova being 
found by PGD to have a chromosomal anomaly or serious disorder that would affect 
pregnancy or birth. 
A further category of actions in relation to the in-vitro ovum occupies a middle 
ground because they maximise the ability of ova to fulfil their potential only to the 
extent that without them women might not want to implant at all. The use of PGD 
to find an ovum with characteristics that fit the needs of an existing child and to detect 
genetic disorders that do not affect pregnancy or birth, fall into this category. 
Interestingly, after granting a licence in the Hashmi case, the Authority rejected an 
application for tissue-typing from a family whose child suffered from a rare condition 
called Diamond Blackfan anaemia. The only difference with this case was that the 
biopsy was being performed to allow testing for tissue-type, not for genetic disorder as 
well. However, in both cases ova were created to fulfil the needs of a sick child and 
in both they would be discarded if they could not fulfil that role. Hence, the 
Authority's own Ethics Committee was right to suggest that there was no ethical basis 
to treat the two cases differently.45 
Using PGD to find an ovum genetically encoded with a particular eye or hair colour 
or gender (for social reasons) also fall into this category. However, they do so in a 
much more consumer orientated way that implies that there is no case for giving ova 
any moral consideration in their own right. Indeed, such testing may be more 
Ibid. 
Harris, J . , The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (Routledge, 1985), pp. 11-12. 
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questionable than creating in-vitro ova purely as subjects for research which occupies 
an end ground of actions which have nothing to do with enabling ova to fulfil their 
potential. 
In terms of consequences, it is difficult to evaluate these forms of action vis-a-vis the 
ovum completely without our being certain whether it should have rights. However, 
one thing is clear: allowing genetic characteristics to influence selection of in-vitro ova 
is eugenic in the broadest sense of the word because it alters the composition of the 
human gene pool.47 When those making this choice do so because of genetic 
characteristics rather than because of the impact on their life of having a child with 
these characteristics, we enter the realms of eugenics in the narrow sense of the word. 
Humans can have powerful instinctive fears as regards their own future, their ability 
to procreate successfully and the future of their wider group or nation. In the last 
century, several states expressed, legitimised and even encouraged these deep-rooted 
fears to perpetrate various forms of narrow eugenics. One example is the sterilisation 
on social grounds of those whose procreation was deemed to put the future flourishing 
of the nation under threat.48 "Narrow" eugenics on humans is now widely condemned 
but it continues to be given scope for expression on both the embryo and the ovum. 
With the implanted embryo, it is almost actively condoned by the structure of the 
Abortion Act 1967, section l(l)(d). In setting out the circumstances in which abortion 
can be authorised, sections l(l)(a), (b) and (c) weigh the interests of the embryo/foetus 
with those of the woman/her family. However, the subsection l(l)(d) merely requires 
a (substantial) risk of it being born with (serious) handicap. In other words, it 
encourages a focus on the nature of the problem rather than its impact on others.49 
With an in-vitro ovum the protection is at best similar. Tissue-typing does not give 
rise to narrow eugenics selection. However, the use of PGD to detect abnormality may 
do so even if that abnormality is serious, as the Authority currently requires. This is 
because without establishing the intentions of the parties such decisions can be made 
on the basis of the nature of a disability rather than its impact on others. The 
Authority leaves it to clinicians to determine what serious means on a case-by-case 
basis rather than compiling a list of such disorders. This is understandable for a 
number of reasons. For example, the list would have to be constantly reviewed as 
understanding and treatment of disorders affected judgment of their seriousness and the 
list could not take into account family and personal circumstances or the potential 
nature, severity and likelihood of transmission in an individual case. In addition, the 
Authority appears to have a significant measure of confidence in the capacity of centres 
to define the term "serious" in a reasonable way: 
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At present . . . centres are understood to be applying the criteria for termination of 
pregnancy for foetal abnormality published by the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists . . . This limits the use of P N D to cases where there is a precise diagnosis 
and a "substantial risk" of "serious" handicap.50 
In this respect ova are given the same level of protection against being discarded on 
grounds of disability as is provided to embryos pursuant to these guidelines, which are 
an interpretation of the Abortion Act 1967, section l(l)(d). However, on the downside, 
there are concerns that the term "serious" is given too diluted an interpretation.51 If 
so, the likelihood of decisions being made on a narrow eugenics basis is increased. 
Furthermore, it is far easier emotionally, physically, strategically and practically to give 
up in-vitro ova than a (probably lone) embryo that is already implanted. Hence, despite 
its financial cost and invasiveness, " P G D has a far greater eugenic potential than 
prenatal genetic testing".52 If there is an opportunity for decisions to be made on a 
narrow eugenics basis, P G D will make it easier to take advantage of the opportunity. 
Even when selection after P G D is not done on narrow eugenics grounds, it poses 
potential dangers. Judging the characteristics of in-vitro ova could encourage people 
adversely to judge human characteristics generally, to the extent that, where individuals 
have characteristics thought of as less desirable, adverse attitudes and prejudicial 
treatment could be condoned. Social pressure could also be put on potential parents to 
select. Already, the Authority has rather bizarrely53 asked in its consultation document 
whether the "principle of the welfare of the child (can) ever be compatible with a 
decision to begin a pregnancy knowing that a child will be born with a genetic 
disorder?"54 Even i f P G D is restricted to more serious purposes, as is currently the 
case, there may be pressure to allow it in less serious cases to the point at which the 
process of founding a family is viewed in a destructively consumerist fashion. Indeed, 
this pressure already exists. The Authority is already considering whether to allow 
P G D to detect gender beyond situations where there is a special risk of chromosomal 
anomaly or serious genetic disorder to situations where the parents already have several 
children of the opposite gender. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has gone further. 
It suggests that, should we gain the ability, P G D should not be used to screen for 
"behavioural traits in the normal range such as intelligence, sexual orientation and 
personality traits"55 but that a case might still be made for using it to enable one to 
have a child with modestly enhanced behavioural traits.56 It suggested that this "would 
not seriously undermine the present relationship between parents and their children".57 
It was not entirely persuaded by conservative reasoning on the matter - such as the 
view that attempts to control the type of child one has in this way represents a failure 
to have natural humility.58 The Council's view is difficult to agree with. There may be 
a right to protect oneself from having a child with a serious handicap on the basis that 
50
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such a child would be much harder to rear, but there is certainly not such a thing as 
a right to ensure for social reasons that one has a child of a certain gender, hair or eye 
colour or with certain behavioural traits that one likes. Decisions to reject ova on the 
basis that they do not have such characteristics constitute narrow eugenics. 
Using P G D to tissue-type for match with an existing sick child also raises problems. 
For one thing, if the mother's donation from her placenta fails there will be pressure 
on the resultant child to donate. The Authority has pointed out that there are 
procedures in place to protect the interests of the new child should such a scenario 
arise.59 However, these procedures do not - in the case of bone marrow donation at 
least - include mandatory court involvement. Furthermore, from a sociological 
standpoint there are obvious conflicts of interest. In particular, the medical profession 
has an interest in "overall utility" and the family in "family utility" both of which can 
be inconsistent with what is best for the child. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The ability of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 to cope with scientific 
developments that had never been envisaged when it was passed has been under serious 
scrutiny in recent years. Considerable doubt about the Act's ability to cope was raised 
when the Hashmis' case and the question of legality of cloning by cell nuclear 
replacement were going through the courts.60 The House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee took the view that the Act needed urgent reform to reconnect 
it with modern science.61 This call was endorsed by the Authority's new chief executive 
who suggested that "clearer legislation is desperately needed that takes into account the 
massive advances that have taken place since the last act was drafted and is less open 
to misinterpretation".62 The government seemed to be alone in thinking that the Act 
was functioning sufficiently well not to need an overhaul.63 However, the House of 
Lords' dexterous interpretation of the Act's applicability to cloning by cell nuclear 
replacement64 along with the Court of Appeal's decision in the instant case has shown 
that there is some merit to the government's view. The case for Parliament to consider 
reform is not that the Act is proving difficult to adapt to new conditions as the reverse; 
the courts are applying the Act to areas which raise very important issues of ethics that 
Parliament did not contemplate when passing it. P G D is a classic case in point. For 
the use of it to be controlled by the Authority rather specifically determined by 
Parliament is democratically deficient. The deficiency was worsened in the Hashmi case 
by the fact that using P G D for tissue-typing was not something on which it had 
consulted the public in either its 1999 document or before. Indeed, The House of 
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Commons Science and Technology Committee criticised the Authority for authorising 
this use without specific consultation.65 The Department of Health noted that it was 
not practical to consult further before making the decision.66 However, the response to 
this could be that we should not march forward with expanding the use of an ethically 
controversial technology without consultation simply because of the exigencies of a 
single case. 
So what position should Parliament take? I would maintain that IVF should not be 
permitted under any circumstances. Nevertheless, if it is to be permitted, the case for 
arguing that the ovum has rights appears to be too weak on its own to prevent forms 
of action on it that are contrary to the actualisation of its potential. However, the need 
to prevent narrow eugenics is sufficient on its own to ban PGD for purposes beyond 
those already licensed by the Authority. Furthermore, the slim possibility that the 
ovum should be afforded rights combined with fears of a slippery slope in terms of how 
we treat other forms of life, may be enough to warrant a prohibition on the use of 
PGD for tissue-typing and the creation of ova simply as subjects of research. 
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